Insights

South Korea’s 2035 NDC: A "Blueprint" is Missing

ㅣ Karl Yang, Founder & Executive Director of KoSIF ㅣ

The government has finalized the 2035 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), setting a reduction goal of 53% to 61% compared to 2018 levels. Following public debates in September and October, and a public hearing on November 6, the target was formalized through a committee resolution and a Cabinet meeting. The base-year emissions(742.3MtCO₂e) were also explicitly specified at.

Looking at the numbers alone, this could be interpreted as an "upgraded target." However, the value of a policy is judged not by mere figures, but by its "pathway" and "implementation." The current national reduction target falls short in three major areas.

First, the range-based target is problematic. A range of 53% to 61% merely leaves political wiggle room; the market typically operates based on the lower bound (53%). There must be a mechanism that locks in a single, definitive figure alongside annual carbon budgets for every five-year period leading up to 2050, accompanied by an automatic adjustment system that raises the target if deviations exceed a certain threshold. It is the credibility of the pathway, not the target itself, that moves capital.

Second, the "map" for the power sector transition is blank. The government must present a realistic power mix that includes renewable energy, existing nuclear power, and low-carbon heat. Furthermore, it needs to disclose annual and regional targets for power grid expansion (in km), substation capacity (in MVA), storage (in MWh), and demand response (DR) targets (in MW). If the aspects of "where, what, and by when" remain invisible, corporations and financial institutions will not move. Currently, the government has merely listed tools across various sectors—such as power, industry, buildings, and transport—without quantifying specific, concrete goals.

Third, the just transition of industry must not be a mere slogan; it must be a "project pipeline." The government should disclose the Best Available Technology (BAT) deployment curves for each sector, including steel (hydrogen reduction), cement (clinker reduction and alternative fuels), petrochemicals (electrification and heat recovery), and semiconductors/batteries (procuring carbon-free energy). It should also design a package of policy finance, guarantees, tax incentives, and green premiums to provide differential support based on reduction performance per ton. What we need instead of declarations is a scheduled timeline for assembly line replacements and a structured financing framework.

Two additional pillars must be integrated into this foundation. One is demand management. For the power sector transition to hold up, peak demand must be curbed through dedicated infrastructure for commercial vehicle electrification, the electrification of rail and shipping, deep retrofits of buildings alongside performance-based subsidies, smart metering, and mandatory demand response.

The other pillar is redirecting the flow of money toward low-carbon initiatives. Climate budget labeling should be applied to the national budget ledger to categorize and aggregate spending into reduction, adaptation, neutrality, and harmful (fossil fuel-linked) categories, cutting inefficient spending while expanding high-impact areas. Policy finance should open dedicated windows for the transition, offering preferential interest rates and guarantees. Rules surrounding PPAs and RECs must be streamlined, and a default design like a basic green tariff should be implemented to automatically drive demand. Only then will private investment "automatically" gravitate toward low-carbon sectors.

Another indispensable pillar is a just transition. To cushion the impact of job losses and declining tax revenues in carbon-intensive industries and regions, a permanent Just Transition Board must be established to execute a comprehensive package that includes retraining, job re-placement, wage preservation, regional industrial reallocation, and social safety nets. The principle of "leaving no one behind" must be guaranteed by budgets and institutional frameworks, not just rhetoric.

Governance also requires redefining. For the newly renamed National Committee on Climate Crisis Response to become the engine of this transition, it must possess three core powers:

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• • The Authority of a Pathway Manager: The power to finalize and manage carbon budgets and sectoral curves, and to trigger automatic adjustments when deviations occur.
• • The Transparency of a Data Hub: The openness to publish monthly and quarterly investment dashboards alongside indicators for emissions, grid systems, and permitting.
• • The Power of a Fiscal Coordinator: The centralized leverage to oversee and adjust climate budget labeling, redirect fossil fuel-linked subsidies, and allocate transition slots within policy finance.

At the same time, it must lower costs and accelerate progress by combining international mobilization capabilities, such as UNFCCC NDC registry enrollment, international co-investments, mutual recognition of standards, and Article 6 mechanisms.

Numbers are important. However, numbers only become a compass guiding our future when they drive substantial change. For this NDC to serve as a true compass, we must urge for a clearer pathway and swifter execution that bring about an actual transition, rather than simply shouting for higher numbers. The institution responsible for that execution—the National Committee on Climate Crisis Response—must serve as the guide for this low-carbon transition. What matters more than numbers is a trustworthy plan, its execution, and governance tailored to match. When the committee harmonizes these three elements, capital will flow in, the transition will shift from declaration to practice, and South Korea will finally become a climate leader.